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The Self in American and Japanese Cultures
Ideologies of the Self in Cross-cultural Communication

Steven L. Rosen (Copyright)
Hiroshima Women's University, Japan

 

Language and Cultural Contact  · 23 · 1997
Centre for Languages and Intercultural Studies
Aalborg University

ISSN 0908-777x - ISBN 87-7307-605-8
 

This paper was presented at the 3rd Annual Symposium of the Nordic Network for Intercultural Communication, at Aalborg University, 20-23 November 1996.

Contents

 

 Introduction

 

 Theoretical Prologue

 

 The American Self and Communication

 

 The Japanese Self and Communication

 

 Conclusion

 

 Bibliography

 

Introduction

Every culture has concepts of personal being, of what it means to be a 'self'. This paper argues that such self concepts are bound to have a profound effect on cross-cultural communication.

The ethnographic data on American culture shows how metaphorical meanings invent a self/person as a unique decision maker, author of its own motivations and ontologically separable from the social world.

In Japanese culture, on the other hand, the ethnographic data reveals concepts of personhood precipitated out of a set of cultural meanings which feature a radical ontological attachment of the individual to the social world, with self-control and the suppression of (selfish) desires as the central motif of this personhood.

This paper argues that these symbolic matrices centering around personhood are integral to cultural communication and can become problematic in cross-cultural communication encounters.

Theoretical Prologue

The study of the self in social science has, for the most part, come within the scope of role theory in social science, particularly under the rubric of identity theory (sociology) or personality theory (social psychology). Sociologists and social psychologists have understood 'identity'and even 'personality' as a composite of a person's roles and statuses. Role theory has tried to understand personhood in terms of social rules or norms for behavior; an individual internalizes society's rules which then go into the formation of their identity. This internalization process is equated with 'learning' or 'habit formation'. (Wrong 1964:113) Social rules are believed to enter into the actor's constitution, and are, to a large degree, self-imposed. In some schools of sociology, human conduct is seen as totally shaped by common norms. Not only role theory, but the sociology of knowledge in general, has tended to adopt a normative theory of action which assumes that 'actors know and follow rules in social situations.' (Mehan 1975:74). American sociology in particular has taken the view that we take on the 'roles and attitudes of significant others'. (Wurthnow et al. 1984:24).

This social science perspective, which traces its lineage back to Durkheim, G. H. Mead, Sullivan and Dewey, sees consciousness as largely determined by social structures. This model has been criticized elsewhere as resulting in the 'oversocialized conception of Man', or social determinism (Wrong; 1974:116). Of course the more modern incarnations of Meadian social psychology - the interpetive schools of sociology, have tried to focus more on how actors use symbolic meanings provided by culture to construct 'life-worlds'', but they nevertheless tend to reiterate the self vs. society dichotomy characteristic of Western social science; society is something 'out there' with norms (which are usually derived from the power hierachy, perhaps the priesthood or the state), impinging on an individual 'in here'  (Bachnik 1992:152). Perhaps this is why social scientists seem to inevitably fall into the 'oversocialized conception of Man' trap. As long as we posit an individual 'in here' and a society 'out there' (albeit interactive) we are likely to see the individual as determined by 'society,' seen as coercive, implying that everyone (with the exception of sociologists, of course) are robots parroting social roles driven by social structural forces of which they are largely unaware.

The goal of symbolic anthropology's program, in it's theorizing and analysis, is precisely to avoid the imposition of western conceptual categories (like 'role' or 'status' or even 'society'). It will be more difficult if not impossible to discover another culture's self ideologies if we have already interposed our own western (imperialistic) conceptions. Symbolic anthropology, with its especial emphasis on the process of symbolic invention through metaphor/tropes, tries to steer clear of the individual vs. society dichotomy, and all those social science categories which are predicated on that dichotomy (e.g., conformity and deviance).

Culture itself arises out of the dialectic between the individual and the social world - in other words it can be said that communication is culture (and culture is communication). Analysis is situated between convention and invention, meaning and context; symbols are public evidence of how people are constructing their selves, their life-worlds. Culture is the invention of meanings; culture is communication. It's not the case that culture provides a set of rules or norms or even core symbols which we take on board and repeat. Rather, culture is a process of symbolic invention, created each moment in interaction, which plays off a seamless web of shared metaphorical meanings (Wagner 1975:35). Culture is continually articulated through the use of symbolic elements, images, words, gestures and so on. Symbolic elements are meaningful to us because of their associational quality which is brought out in different contexts (40). Communication is possible when participants share and understand these conventional contexts and their articulation. Put another way, culture contains core symbols or meaning sets, centering around certain metaphors which act as structural constraints for meaning formation, suggesting some meanings to be generated and obviating others from occurring. Culture is thereby invented and reinvented moment by moment through interaction by participants, and this includes most radically an invention of a 'self '.

Every culture has a set of conventionalized contexts which articulate a generalized conception of self or personhood – what is ordinarily called ideology or cosmology. This conventional set of meanings, which includes most centrally a concept of what it means to be a person, may be implicit or explicit in action, but it is always there (Wagner 1975:40). Contrary to mainstream sociology, moral personhood is not maintained particularly by education or other institutions, but is continually being reinvented in communication. Communication is a process which 'perpetuates not only the things we learn like language and good manners, but also the regularities of our perceptions, like color and sound, and time and space themselves' (51). It is incumbent on an anthropology of cross-cultural communication to try to get at this 'public symbolic order' (Harris 1989:601) which is articulating, among other things, an experience of personhood. This may seem like a subtle difference but it ensures that we don't fall into the trap of imposing our own social science categories on the subjects we study. We are not interested in arriving at a static definition of what a putative self is – rather we are interested in seeing how others conceptualize and articulate and thus come to actualize a sense of personhood.

The method is quite simply to look for the recurrence of certain core tropes in the ethnographic data – to explore the web of associational meanings which spread out, lattice-like, in interactions. An increasingly rich body of ethnographic data on both American and Japanese culture affords us the chance to pass from one symbolic code to another, to see which sorts of meanings are highlighted in a culture, and which sort of meanings are obviated by these recurring metaphors. Meanings, though generally agreed upon by members of a culture, are obviously not totally and flawlessly comprehended; even within a culture, key metaphors are often loosely held together and loosely shared. This will obviously be one source of intra-cultural mis-communication. Even more so we can see from the semiotic point of view that cross-cultural communication is likely to be problematic in so far as associational meanings are rarely shared between cultures which are different. Danish and Swedish culture may share many metaphors/meanings, but if we compare cultures as diverse as the Pygmies of West Africa and the Yanamamo of the Jungles of Brazil – or American and Japanese culture – we can see how the lack of shared associational meanings easily leads to cross-cultural communication problems.

 

The American Self and Communication

 

 

" 'America' is a gloss for a particular patterning or structure. It is not an object, nor is it a population." (Varenne 1986:25)

Interpretations of American discourse show the existence of certain recurrring metaphors which highlight a sense of self which is highly personal, unique and seaprable from its social matrix. The French anthropologist Herve Varenne has concluded from his ethnography of American culture that the individual as a self-motivating agent is a fundamental cultural category (Varenne 1984:291). We find the theme of ubiquitous choice running through much of the analyses of American cultural discourse. Varenne finds that Americans' self-definition extends so far as to include whether or not to be socialized, enculturated; Americans see themselves as 'Promethean decision makers' (14). This means that Americans are less likely to see themselves has being determined by either social or historical forces than, say for example, Europeans. Another ethnography which further supports this conclusion is Carbaugh's semiotic analysis (1988:84) of the American talk show 'Donahue'. In the ethnographic data from talk show discourses, metaphors highlighting the notion of the importance of personal/individual 'choice' recur with overwhelming regularity. Not only the host, but the guest audience members stress to the guests on the show that they always have and have had the choice whether or not to get pregnant, have an abortion, use contraception, stay with or leave a bad wife or husband and etc.

To be sure, Americans do use pop sociological terms which suggest a realization of the importance of socio-historical forces; tropes like "role" or "identity" are part of the American pop psychological understanding of reality - yet these terms are understood as fundamentally nonbinding. In other words, although Americans might believe that social and historical forces can be part of a person's constitutional make up, they are never radically binding; Americans believe above all else that all humans have ubiquitous choice – including the choice as to whether to conform to traditional values or not.

As part of this program of inventing a freely choosing individual self, it is incumbent upon Americans to articulate themselves in ways which don't seem to be ritualized, stereotypical or stylized (Rosenberg l970:68). The American self is not seen as being expressed through social role but rather is seen as being superior to any role. Americans must 'project and experience their personality as spontaneous and unique' (Wagner 1975:82). With regard to communication praxis, this ideology manifests itself in a speech behavior in which the participants feel it necessary to respect others opinions, and give them the necessary opportunities to express those opinions. It means that each individual has a certain degree of symbolic pressure to reveal to others their personally held opinions. Carbaugh's ethnography suggests even an urgency to express oneself, to establish through discourse one's true feelings, one's choice and unique interests, as part of this ideology of self-reliance (1988:84). As we will see below, this style of self-expression, and self invention is quite different from the Japanese conception and expression of self.

The Japanese Self and Communication

 

 

"I'd never been to a meeting before and didn't know what it would be like. I imagined, however, that all the staff would gather together and each put his own opinions and theories forward." Botchan (Soseki 1906/1976:81)

Japanese ideology insists that the individual create its sense of personhood through self-control and attentiveness to the goals of the reference group. The Japanese sense of self is rarely defined in the abstract as an American self might be (Ohnuki-Tierny 1990:93). Japanese cultural ideology puts little faith in the existence of the individual personality – Japanese 'cannot justify a self identity as a valuable social identity distinct from culturally expected behavior.' (Pelzel 1970:47) The symbolic invention of personhood involves an 'intention of mutuality' in a way that American self-invention does not. Kondo observed in her participant observation of a Japanese workplace, that she was never allowed to act in ways which would suggest that she was an autonomous and free individual (Kondo 1985:26). It seems that in Japanese culture, there is not the same overriding pressure, as there is for Americans, to invent oneself as a free agent, 'one's own man'.

In contrast to American personhood, which is under symbolic pressure not only to be true to one's self but also to publicly express this 'true self', the Japanese sense of self is actualized through self-control. The mark or sign of a truly mature person in Japan is the ability to put aside one's own selfish desires in favor of those of whatever group they find themselves a member of. This orientation is even more marked among women, who must, above all else, be able to accommodate themselves to the needs of others (Kondo 33).

Though Americans view efforts to repress aspects of one's unique selfhood in favor of group demands as oppressive (an American woman once told me that I must be damaging my self psychologically by being able to fit in at Japanese staff meetings), self-control is viewed in Japanese culture, not as a dangerous act of self-castration, but as the mark of a 'healthy personality'  (to use an American phrase). Self-control is a sign of kokoro or 'heart'. I have argued elsewhere that Japanese personhood is is centered around the key trope of kokoro (glossed as 'heart'), and that this ideal is actualized through self-control of selfish desires (Rosen 1990). Standing in binary opposition to this is the metaphor wagamama (glossed as 'selfishness'), seen as a moral evil in Japanese cultural ideology. Japanese selfhood, therefore, is invented along the lines of a symbolic oppositon between selfishness (a moral wrong) and pure heart achieved through self-control (a moral good).

Not only my own ethnographic data but that of others reaffirms this conclusion. In the so-called spiritual education seminars in Japan held by companies and religious groups alike, individuals are taught to improve themselves through the exercise of self-restraint (enryo) and the ability to endure hardship (gaman); the self-improvement which results from this type of self control in the face of both physical and mental hardships is precisely what leads to the actualization of  'heart'/kokoro. In other words, the Japanese self is symbolically constructed in contexts which emphasize self-control as a means to and expression of heart. Personhood then becomes defined as involving the obviation of personal interests in favor of corporate/social ones.

Part of this process of self-control in social situations requires the perfection of the social mask or persona (tatemae). Persona is not the moral evil it is in American culture, not the mark of inauthenticity, but the mark of maturity – it signifies the desire if not the ability to harmonize with the group. My own experience supervising English teachers working at a college in Japan was that westerners often can't understand (what they perceive to be) an overemphasis on form over content in Japanese interaction, in informal as well as formal settings. These westerners tended to denigrate communication which they perceived as being purely ritualized, viewing it as phony and disingenuous, not to mention shallow. But in Japan, it is precisely this ability to skillfully use set phrases and stylized discourse markers which signifies that an individual is a mature self (Kondo 26). So, unlike American selfhood, which demands a person to publicaly show their 'true self', in Japan the development of a ritualized social persona is a necessary condition for Japanese selfhood.

In 1990, when I escorted a group of around 50 students to Cambridge, England for summer English language study, there were continual cross-cultural communication problems which were never resolved. In a nutshell, the British teachers were constantly frustrated by the lack of straightforward answers to direct questions, or frustrated that their questions to the Japanese students were sometimes met by silence, or simple one-word answers. The teachers were frustrated that Japanese students preferred not to reveal personal opinions or give straight-forward replies to direct questions. The Japanese students, for their part, often complained that the teachers couldn't understand what they were trying to communicate!

Smith has observed that, in the interests of group harmony (wa), Japanese will often refrain from putting their own opinions forward (Smith 1983:57). This writer's 'ethnographic experience' living in Japan and working for a Japanese college, has confirmed what most ethnographies have said about this phenomenon: that Japanese are reluctant to express themselves directly, categorically and unequivocally, preferring instead the use of indirection and paralinguistic strategies which would not have them committed to one black and white irrevocable position. The term inshindenshin means a kind of quasi-telepathic communication style characteristic of in-group communication; members know each other so well it becomes less necessary to resort to direct verbal expressions, and this helps maintain group harmony. Since Americans don't participate in such symbolic praxis, this will be an obvious source of cross-cultural communication difficulties.

In Cambridge, the Japanese students failed to realize that the westerners could not value or appreciate communication in which meanings were not directly packaged in words, where individuals didn't try to communicate themselves as unique individuals and unique opinion holders. The existence of a pronounced inside-outide distinction (ura-omote) (not particularly salient in America) also will affect communication; true feelings (honne) are expressed to in-group members while for 'outside' people, interaction is characterized by more mask/ persona (tatemae). Metaphors relating to hierarchy are also relevant here in that communicative reserve will be more pronounced with social superiors. The interested reader is referred to the wealth of literature on Japanese hierarchy and social structure (Nakane 1967; Lebra 1976).

However, what the ethnographic data points too is not just a 'group orientation' for Japanese people (in any culture one can find those who are 'other- directed' and those who make a point of going their own way) – it shows that Japanese are enculturated such that their self definition is generated from a radical ontological attachment to the group. Augustine Barque, in his study of Japanese personhood and cosmology (1993:93-104) argues that Japanese metaphors show a logic of identification rather than identity, 'in which sharing a common attribute entails an intersubjective shift' (101). Whereas the Euro-American tradition stresses a logic of identity with self as clearly distinguished from others (and from nature), the Japanese tradition has stressed the logic of a self in terms of what it is not; if one is, for example, a middle-aged housewife married to a company man, then one can not easily assume the 'role' of 'artist' (102). Berque maintains that Japanese metaphors organize reality into certain sets (Kata) which transcend the individual subject such that the individual is related all the more to their physical and social environment.

This is presumably what social scientists have meant when they say that Japanese have little role flexibility, or more rigid role categories (Lebra 1976:362). This is why a Japanese working for Mitsubishi, for example, would be more likely to reveal themselves as 'a Mitsubishi man' than just 'a company man'. 'In that sense, the Japanese self is relatively permeable with its environment (both social and psychical); but only as much as this environment has been institutionalized (codified) into what reality is for the Japanese.' (Berque 103) The revelance of this for cross-cultural communication encounters is that Japanese may be trying to establish a link for themselves to contexts which transcend themselves. The American, on the other hand, may be trying to reiterate a sense of self as separate and distinct from both the other and the communicative context, and may feel uncomfortable with efforts to establish a (radical) empathic link with the other in communication praxis.

Conclusion

In Japanese culture, key tropes, core symbols, center around a sense of personhood as actualized in social contexts. American cultural metaphors articulate a definition of personhood as something actualized by freedom of choice which is the expression of a self-reliant self, a unique personality invented precisely as a result of personal 'choices'. Americans are under a pressure to try to communicate themselves as unique human beings not falsified by social norms. The moral urgency to 'express oneself' directly and clearly in public, is not part of Japanese cultural ideology.

The American understanding of and emphasis on 'self-reliance' in the invention of personhood, is foreign to Japanese culture. In Japanese cultural ideology, going against the group or 'going my way' as the Japanese put it (borrowing a western phrase), is a sign of selfishness. Japanese metaphors articulate an ideology of self in which personhood is actualized in social contexts which transcend a putative 'individual.' In the on-going process of cultural invention which is communication, Japanese will be trying to articulate this conception of self which is radically different from American self-definitions. If, in cross-cultural communication encounters between Americans and Japanese, the participants are unawares of their cultural ideologies of personhood which structure their perceptions and experience of reality (not to mention their communicative styles), then there's likely to be a great deal of mis-communication.

While this paper has outlined some of the theoretical issues at stake, it still remains to analyze specific communication encounters between Americans and Japanese to see how these culturally specific definitions of self tend to obviate meaningful communication. The failure to look at the symbolic matrices which radically structure, among other things, an experience of the self will be to condemn oneself to intercultural communication which is superficial at best.

 

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